Introduction and background
Secure communications is one of the most important topics in the telecommunication field. At present, cryptography, the art of hiding information in a string of bits meaningless to any unauthorized party, is usually used for secure communications.
Classical cryptography, whose security is based on the need for a large amount of computation, is widely used in today's communications systems. However, this type of cryptography will be vulnerable to attack from clever eavesdroppers in the future. For example, RSA public key cryptography (named after Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) is based on the difficulty of factoring large integers. If an efficient way to factorize large integers is found, RSA will no longer be secure. In fact, with the advent of quantum computers, it will be possible to factor large numbers in an instant. Therefore, a lot of activity is being focused on finding cryptography schemes that will provide ultimately secure communications. Now quantum cryptography is in the spotlight. Even if a quantum computer is made, quantum cryptography provides ultimately secure communications because its security is based not on computational power but on the laws of quantum mechanics [1] .
Quantum key distribution
Quantum cryptography allows two physically separated parties to create a random secret key. For this reason, it is often called quantum key distribution (QKD). Once a sender (Alice) and a receiver (Bob) share random secret keys, they can achieve perfectly secure communication using a one-time-pad method, which has been proved to provide complete security.
In short, QKD is a technique for establishing a quantum channel on which Alice and Bob can detect the existence of an eavesdropper. When this quantum channel is available, Alice and Bob can create a key through it and can be assured of the security of the key. The quantum channel is constructed based on the following theorem in quantum mechanics: an eavesdropper (Eve) cannot acquire any information from a quantum state transmitted from Alice to Bob without disturbing its quantum state, so when Eve acquires some information from the quantum state, the state is perturbed and a key bit error is induced. This theorem is deduced from the following laws of quantum mechanics.
(1) With an appropriate measurement basis, a certain physical property of a quantum state is determinately measured. But with another measurement basis, the physical property is measured probabilistically.
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Abstract
Quantum cryptography promises to provide communications with unconditional security on the basis of the physical principles of quantum mechanics. We have proposed a quantum key distribution protocol called a differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution (DPS-QKD). This scheme has several advantages including suitability for fiber transmission and highly efficient key generation. In this paper, we review quantum cryptography technologies and then describe our scheme DPS-QKD. In an experiment using a planar lightwave circuit Mach-Zehnder interferometer, DPS-QKD achieved stable polarization-independent operation during 20-km fiber transmission. The raw key creation rate was 3076 bit/s with a 5.0% quantum bit error rate. (2) No one can clone an unknown quantum state in general.
Differential-phase-shift Quantum Key Distribution
Based on the above idea, Alice and Bob can generate a secret key as follows. Alice encodes the bit information onto quantum states and sends it to Bob through the quantum channel. Bob randomly chooses a measurement basis for each quantum state and measures the state. After that, Bob discloses the measurement basis and then Alice and Bob choose the proper bits, which could be a raw key. To check the existence of an eavesdropper, Alice and Bob choose a fraction of their raw keys and compare them over a public (classical) channel. If an eavesdropper measures the quantum state to steal the information, the quantum state changes and a key bit error is induced with some probability. Thus, from the error rate in the test bits, Alice and Bob can detect whether an eavesdropper exists or not and also evaluate the amount of leaked information, assuming that all errors, including those due to imperfections in practical systems, result from eavesdropping. If the estimated information leakage exceeds an upper bound, they discard their raw keys. If the error rate or leakage is small, they perform the following sequence. First, Alice and Bob perform error correction to obtain a matched bit string. The obtained string may not be completely private. To eliminate the possibility of leakage, Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification [1] , which shortens the error-corrected keys using a universal hash function. Then they distill a fully secret key, which can be used with full confidence to encrypt a message.
Conventional QKD protocol and
implementation Several protocols have been proposed for the above idea, such as BB84 [2] , B92 [3] , and E91 [4] . Here, we overview BB84, the most famous QKD protocol, to explain the above idea. We also introduce Plug & Play QKD, which is a widely performed fiber-based BB84-QKD implementation.
BB84 protocol
BB84, which was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984, is a QKD protocol using four quantum states with two non-orthogonal bases. In practice, a single photon is used as a quantum state. In implementing the BB84 protocol, there are two ways to encode bit information onto a single photon: polarization encoding and phase encoding. Here, we describe polarization encoding because it is easy to understand intuitively. them randomly before measuring each photon. One of the filters allows him to distinguish between horizontally and vertically polarized photons, whereas the other distinguishes between right and left circularly polarized ones. When Bob chooses the matched filter, he gets the correct output. When Bob chooses the filter that does not correspond to the polarization state sent by Alice, each outcome can occur with 50% probability. Bob records the filters used and the outcomes.
Second, after receiving a sufficient number of photons, Bob announces through a public channel which filter he used for each photon, but does not reveal the measurement results. Alice compares Bob's data with the list of states she sent, and tells Bob for which photons he used a compatible filter, but not the polarization states themselves. In cases where states and filters are compatible, they keep the data. Otherwise the data are simply discarded. Under the agreement that vertical linear or right circular polarization states denote a "0" bit and horizontal linear or left circular polarization states denote a "1" bit, Alice and Bob can share the same bit string, which could be a raw key.
Third, Alice and Bob each choose a fraction of their raw keys and compare them over a public channel to assess the secrecy of their communication. They perform error correction and privacy amplification, as described in the previous section. Then, Alice and Bob can share a secret key, which can be used with perfect confidence to encrypt a message.
Plug & Play QKD
Though QKD using polarization states is easy to understand, it is not suitable for fiber transmission, because the polarization state is not maintained because of the birefringence in optical fiber. A QKD setup suitable for fiber transmission has been proposed by Muller et al. [5] . In this system, instead of being encoded onto polarization states, the bit information is encoded onto the relative phase of the superposition of single photon states. This is what is known as phase coding. Most experiments and commercial products use this QKD setup. After receiving a sufficient number of photons, Bob announces on a public channel which phase modulation he imposed on each pulse.
Alice compares this sequence with the list of her phase modulations and tells Bob for which photons he imposed compatible phase modulations.
Under the agreement that the phase difference φ a -φ b of 0 denotes a "0" bit and the phase difference φ a -φ b of π denotes a "1" bit, Alice and Bob can share the same bit string, which could be a raw key.
The great advantage of this setup is that the polarization change in the transmission line is automatically compensated. However, this scheme has some disadvantages. First, the light traveling in an optical fiber is scattered by inhomogeneities. A small fraction of the light is recaptured by the fiber in the backward direction, which is called Rayleigh backscattering. Because of the intrinsically bi-directional nature of the system, backscattered photons induce errors. To avoid this Rayleigh backscattering, the repetition frequency must not be too high.
Second, light transmitted through the fiber must be phase-modulated at Alice's site, so polarization control is needed.
Third, there are many components, such as a phasemodulator, polarization controllers, a polarization beam-splitter, and a circulator, at Bob's site. These components increase the excess loss, so many of the photons that have traveled back from Alice vanish at Bob's site.
Differential-phase-shift QKD
We proposed DPS-QKD [6] to overcome the disadvantages of conventional QKD protocols. This scheme uses the uncertainty of the detection time of photons and encodes the bit information onto the phase difference between two sequential pulses. Figure 3 shows the setup and protocol sequence of the DPS-QKD scheme. Alice randomly phase-modulates a pulse train of weak coherent states by {0, π} for each pulse and sends it to Bob with an average photon number of less than one per pulse. Bob divides each incoming pulse into two paths and recombines them with a 50:50 beam splitter, where the path-length difference is set equal to the time interval of the sequential pulses. Photon detectors are placed at the two outputs of the recombining beam splitter. At the detectors, the partial wave functions of two sequential pulses interfere with each other, as illustrated in Fig. 3 . With an appropriate phase in the interferometer, detector 1 clicks for 0 phase difference between the two consecutive pulses and detector 2 clicks for π phase difference.
Protocol
Using the above setup, Alice and Bob create a raw key by the following protocol. After raw transmission, Bob tells Alice the time instances at which a photon was counted. From this time information and her modulation data, Alice knows which detector clicked at Bob's site. Under the agreement that a click by detector 1 denotes "0" and a click by detector 2 denotes "1", for example, Alice and Bob obtain an identical bit string.
Eavesdropping
DPS-QKD uses the uncertainty of the detection time of photons. If an eavesdropper steals a photon and sends a fake one, Alice and Bob notice the existence of the eavesdropper from the bit error induced by the detection timing error.
Here, we show one example of security against one type of intercept-resend attack. Eve intercepts and measures transmitted states and resends a false signal to Bob according to her measurement, as illustrated in Fig. 4 . Eve cannot measure every phase difference because the transmitted state is less than one photon per pulse. Eve thus sends a signal only when she detects a photon. She sends a single photon split into two time slots through an interferometer identical to Bob's, in which the relative phase between the two time slots is 0 or π depending on the measured phase difference. For unmeasured time slots, on the other hand, she sends no photon. This fake signal generates the same count rate in Bob's detectors as the original one. Bob does not notice the eavesdropping from the photon counting rate. However, a bit error is introduced from this fake signal as follows. When a photon split into two time slots arrives at Bob's site, he could count a photon at one of three possible time instances: (1) when a photon passes through the short path in Eve's interferometer and the short path in Bob's interferometer, (2) when a photon passes through Eve's short path and Bob's long path or through Eve's long path and Bob's short path, or (3) when a photon passes through Eve's long path and Bob's long path. In the second case the detector clicks according to the phase difference between the two time slots, which gives a correct answer. Bob does not notice any eavesdropping in this case. However, no interference occurs and the detectors click randomly at the first and third time instances. A bit error is introduced by these detection events. The probability of clicks at the first or third time instances is , so the error rate is . The eavesdropping is revealed from this error rate.
Features
DPS-QKD has several advantages over conventional QKD schemes.
First, this scheme is polarization insensitive, provided that a polarization insensitive interferometer is available. In our scheme, the information is carried by the phase difference between two sequential pulses. Though the polarization state changes after propagation through the fiber, two sequential pulses experience the same change so they have the same polarization state at the fiber output, as long as the time interval of two sequential pulses is much shorter than the time constant of the change in the fiber. This condition is satisfied in actual systems because changes in temperature and/or mechanical pressure have a slow time constant compared with the pulse interval. Therefore, nearly perfect interference between two sequential pulses is possible independent of polarization change in fiber.
Second, DPS-QKD has a simpler receiver setup and thus smaller loss than other QKD setups. Selected Papers tioned before) many components, which increase the excess loss at the receiver's site. In DPS-QKD on the other hand, there is only one interferometer at the receiver's site so the excess loss is much smaller. Very few photons are lost at the receiver's site, which means we can achieve a high key generation rate.
Third, key generation efficiency is high compared with conventional QKD protocols. In the BB84 protocol, half of the received photons are discarded because they are basis-mismatched. On the other hand, the DPS-QKD protocol utilizes all photons for creating a key, which provides high efficiency.
Fourth, in the DPS-QKD setup, it is possible to send a light pulse at a high repetition frequency. In the Plug & Play QKD setup, the repetition frequency cannot be made too high because of Rayleigh backscattering. On the other hand, DPS-QKD is a one-way transmission system so the light can be transmitted at a high repetition frequency and we can achieve a high key generation rate.
Experiment
As described above, the DPS-QKD scheme has some advantages over conventional QKD schemes. One of the most characteristic advantages is the polarization insensitive operation. However, this presupposes that a stable and polarization insensitive interferometer is available. We performed an experiment using a Mach-Zehnder interferometer fabricated using a planar lightwave circuit (PLC) based on silica waveguide technologies [7] - [9] .
Performance of the PLC Mach-Zehnder
interferometer Before conducting the transmission experiment, we evaluated the performance of the PLC Mach-Zehnder interferometer. We used one packaged with input and output fibers. A peltier device and a thermistor were attached to the PLC chip to control the temperature, so the phase difference between the two waveguide paths could be stably controlled. The path-length difference was 20 cm, which introduced a one-bit delay of 1 ns at 1 Gbit/s. The excess loss of the interferometer was 2.64 dB (fiber-to-fiber). The PLC is sensitive to the polarization state due to its birefringence (about 10 -4 ), which is induced by the residual stress in the silica glass film. This results in a polarizationdependent spectral response shift and degrades the extinction ratio. The shift can be eliminated using a birefringence compensation technique or by choosing the wavelength at which the shift is zero. To evaluate the stability of the interferometer, we measured the extinction ratio at various temperatures for the best and worst polarization states. Figure 5 shows the results, where the upper and lower lines are the extinction ratios for the worst and best polarization states, respectively. Even for the worst polarization state, an extinction ratio of less than -20 dB (1%) was obtained under temperature control within 0.05°C. At the optimum temperature, the polarization dependence was small, so that the extinction ratio ranged from 0.27 to 0.46% when the input polarization state was varied. These results show that stable polarization-independent operation is possible using a PLC Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Figure 6 shows the experimental setup. The transmitter, Alice, randomly phase-modulated a pulse train of coherent light by {0, π} for each pulse. The pulse train was created by intensity-modulating continuous wave (CW) light from an external-cavity laser diode (wavelength: 1551 nm). The pulse width was 125 ps and the repetition rate was 1 GHz. The phase modulation was imposed with a LiNbO 3 modulator driven by a pulse pattern generator. Then, the light power was attenuated to be 0.1 photon per pulse on average and was injected into a 20-km fiber (propagation loss: 4.46 dB). The receiver, Bob, measured the phase difference between two sequential pulses using a PLC Mach-Zehnder interferometer, which was set to provide the best extinction ratio for the worst polarization state. Photon detectors were placed at the two outputs of the interferometer. With an appropriate phase in the interferometer, detector 1 clicked for 0 phase difference between two consecutive pulses and detector 2 clicked for π phase difference. Avalanche photodiodes (APDs) were used as the photon detectors, which were gated at 5 MHz. The gate pulse was synchronized with the light pulse. The quantum efficiency was about 4.24% and the dark count probability was about 2.21 × 10 -5 per gate. In detecting photons, Bob recorded the photon arrival time and which detector clicked. Using the above setup, Alice and Bob created raw secret keys at their respective sites, following the protocol described in the previous section. The quantum bit error rate (QBER) was estimated from the difference between the created keys. The polarization state was set to produce the worst QBER in this measurement to test the worst-case scenario. The raw key generation rate was estimated from the number of photons counted and the time over which the time interval analyzer (TIA) actually measured. The results are shown in Fig. 7 , where the QBER and the raw key generation rate are plotted as a function of the time window, which here is the margin for the photon arrival time. Since our APD and TIA had some timing jitter, the measured arrival time fluctuated and errors may have been induced. To reduce this timing error, Bob took data within the time window, at the expense of the key generation rate. When the time window was 0.6 ns, key creation was performed at a rate of 3076 bit/s with a QBER of 5.0%. A sufficient QBER was obtained to create a secret key after error correction and privacy amplification.
Experimental setup
Conclusion
After reviewing quantum cryptography technologies, we described our QKD protocol called differential-phase-shift QKD. This scheme makes use of the uncertainty in the photon detection time. It has a simple configuration for practical implementation and is suitable for fiber transmission provided a stable polarization-insensitive interferometer is available. We showed that a PLC interferometer based on silica waveguide technologies provides polarizationinsensitive operation stable enough for the DPS- QKD in practice. In a transmission experiment over a 20-km fiber, we obtained a key generation rate of 3076 bit/s and a QBER of 5.0%. These experimental results indicate that practical implementation of the DPS-QKD scheme should be possible. Currently, the key generation rate is limited by the performance of the photon detector. A higher rate should be possible by improving the photon detector performance. We plan to develop a high-performance photon detector and use it in an experiment to show the DPS-QKD's potential for a high key generation rate compared with other conventional QKD schemes. 
